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Abstract. An essential component of inference based on familiar fre-
quentist notions, such as p-values, significance and confidence levels,
is the relevant sampling distribution. This feature results in violations
of a principle known as the strong likelihood principle (SLP), the fo-
cus of this paper. In particular, if outcomes x∗ and y∗ from exper-
iments E1 and E2 (both with unknown parameter θ) have different
probability models f1(·), f2(·), then even though f1(x∗; θ) = cf2(y∗; θ)
for all θ, outcomes x∗ and y∗ may have different implications for an
inference about θ. Although such violations stem from considering out-
comes other than the one observed, we argue this does not require us
to consider experiments other than the one performed to produce the
data. David Cox [Ann. Math. Statist. 29 (1958) 357–372] proposes the
Weak Conditionality Principle (WCP) to justify restricting the space
of relevant repetitions. The WCP says that once it is known which Ei
produced the measurement, the assessment should be in terms of the
properties of Ei. The surprising upshot of Allan Birnbaum’s [J. Amer.
Statist. Assoc. 57 (1962) 269–306] argument is that the SLP appears
to follow from applying the WCP in the case of mixtures, and so un-
controversial a principle as sufficiency (SP). But this would preclude
the use of sampling distributions. The goal of this article is to provide
a new clarification and critique of Birnbaum’s argument. Although his
argument purports that [(WCP and SP) entails SLP], we show how
data may violate the SLP while holding both the WCP and SP. Such
cases also refute [WCP entails SLP].
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is easy to see why Birnbaum’s argument for the
strong likelihood principle (SLP) has long been held
as a significant, if controversial, result for the foun-
dations of statistics. Not only do all of the famil-
iar frequentist error-probability notions, p-values,
significance levels and so on violate the SLP, but
the Birnbaum argument purports to show that the
SLP follows from principles that frequentist sam-
pling theorists accept:
The likelihood principle is incompatible
with the main body of modern statistical
theory and practice, notably the Neyman–
1
2 D. G. MAYO
Pearson theory of hypothesis testing and
of confidence intervals, and incompatible
in general even with such well-known con-
cepts as standard error of an estimate and
significance level. [Birnbaum (1968), page
300.]
The incompatibility, in a nutshell, is that on the
SLP, once the data x are given, outcomes other than
x are irrelevant to the evidential import of x. “[I]t
is clear that reporting significance levels violates the
LP [SLP], since significance levels involve averaging
over sample points other than just the observed x.”
[Berger and Wolpert (1988), page 105.]
1.1 The SLP and a Frequentist Principle of
Evidence (FEV)
Birnbaum, while responsible for this famous ar-
gument, rejected the SLP because “the likelihood
concept cannot be construed so as to allow useful
appraisal, and thereby possible control, of probabili-
ties of erroneous interpretations” [Birnbaum (1969),
page 128]. That is, he thought the SLP at odds with
a fundamental frequentist principle of evidence.
Frequentist Principle of Evidence (general): Draw-
ing inferences from data requires considering the rel-
evant error probabilities associated with the under-
lying data generating process.
David Cox intended the central principle invoked
in Birnbaum’s argument, the Weak Conditionality
Principle (WCP), as one important way to justify
restricting the space of repetitions that are rele-
vant for informative inference. Implicit in this goal
is that the role of the sampling distribution for
informative inference is not merely to ensure low
error rates in repeated applications of a method,
but to avoid misleading inferences in the case at
hand [Mayo (1996); Mayo and Spanos (2006, 2011);
Mayo and Cox (2010)].
To refer to the most familiar example, the WCP
says that if a parameter of interest θ could be mea-
sured by two instruments, one more precise then
the other, and a randomizer that is utterly irrel-
evant to θ is used to decide which instrument to
use, then, once it is known which experiment was
run and its outcome given, the inference should be
assessed using the behavior of the instrument actu-
ally used. The convex combination of the two in-
struments, linked via the randomizer, defines a mix-
ture experiment, Emix. According to the WCP, one
should condition on the known experiment, even if
an unconditional assessment improves the long-run
performance [Cox and Hinkley (1974), pages 96–97].
While conditioning on the instrument actually
used seems obviously correct, nothing precludes the
Neyman–Pearson theory from choosing the proce-
dure “which is best on the average over both ex-
periments” in Emix [Lehmann and Romano (2005),
page 394]. They ask the following: “for a given test
or confidence procedure, should probabilities such
as level, power, and confidence coefficient be calcu-
lated conditionally, given the experiment that has
been selected, or unconditionally?” They suggest
that “[t]he answer cannot be found within the model
but depends on the context” (ibid). The WCP gives
a rationale for using the conditional appraisal in the
context of informative parametric inference.
1.2 What Must Logically Be Shown
However, the upshot of the SLP is to claim that
the sampling theorist must go all the way, as it were,
given a parametric model. If she restricts attention
to the experiment producing the data in the mix-
ture experiment, then she is led to consider just the
data and not the sample space, once the data are in
hand. While the argument has been stated in various
forms, the surprising upshot of all versions is that
the SLP appears to follow from applying the WCP
in the case of mixture experiments, and so uncon-
troversial a notion as sufficiency (SP). “Within the
context of what can be called classical frequency-
based statistical inference, Birnbaum (1962) argued
that the conditionality and sufficiency principles im-
ply the [strong] likelihood principle” [Evans, Fraser
and Monette (1986), page 182].
Since the challenge is for a sampling theorist who
holds the WCP, it is obligatory to consider whether
and how such a sampling theorist can meet it. While
the WCP is not itself a theorem in a formal system,
Birnbaum’s argument purports that the following is
a theorem:
[(WCP and SP) entails SLP].
If true, any data instantiating both WCP and SP
could not also violate the SLP, on pain of logical
contradiction. We will show how data may violate
the SLP while still adhering to both the WCP and
SP. Such cases also refute [WCP entails SLP], mak-
ing our argument applicable to attempts to weaken
or remove the SP. Violating SLP may be written as
not-SLP.
We follow the formulations of the Birnbaum argu-
ment given in Berger and Wolpert (1988), Birnbaum
(1962), Casella and Berger (2002) and Cox (1977).
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The current analysis clarifies and fills in important
gaps of an earlier discussion in Mayo (2010), Mayo
and Cox (2011), and lets us cut through a fascinat-
ing and complex literature. The puzzle is solved by
adequately stating the WCP and keeping the mean-
ing of terms consistent, as they must be in an argu-
ment built on a series of identities.
1.3 Does It Matter?
On the face of it, current day uses of sampling
theory statistics do not seem in need of going back
50 years to tackle a foundational argument. This
may be so, but only if it is correct to assume that
the Birnbaum argument is flawed somewhere. Sam-
pling theorists who feel unconvinced by some of the
machinations of the argument must admit some dis-
comfort at the lack of resolution of the paradox. If
one cannot show the relevance of error probabilities
and sampling distributions to inferences once the
data are in hand, then the uses of frequentist sam-
pling theory, and resampling methods, for inference
purposes rest on shaky foundations.
The SLP is deemed of sufficient importance to be
included in textbooks on statistics, along with a ver-
sion of Birnbaum’s argument that we will consider:
It is not uncommon to see statistics texts
argue that in frequentist theory one is
faced with the following dilemma: either
to deny the appropriateness of condition-
ing on the precision of the tool chosen
by the toss of a coin, or else to embrace
the strong likelihood principle, which en-
tails that frequentist sampling distribu-
tions are irrelevant to inference once the
data are obtained. This is a false dilemma.
. . . The ‘dilemma’ argument is therefore
an illusion. [Cox and Mayo (2010), page
298.]
If we are correct, this refutes a position that is
generally presented as settled in current texts. But
the illusion is not so easy to dispel, thus this paper.
Perhaps, too, our discussion will illuminate a point
of agreement between sampling theorists and con-
temporary nonsubjective Bayesians who concede
they “have to live with some violations of the likeli-
hood and stopping rule principles” [Ghosh, Delam-
pady and Sumanta (2006), page 148], since their
prior probability distributions are influenced by the
sampling distribution. “This, of course, does not
happen with subjective Bayesianism. . . . the objec-
tive Bayesian responds that objectivity can only
be defined relative to a frame of reference, and
this frame needs to include the goal of the analy-
sis.” [Berger (2006), page 394.] By contrast, Savage
stressed:
According to Bayes’s theorem, P (x|θ) . . .
constitutes the entire evidence of the ex-
periment . . . [I]f y is the datum of some
other experiment, and if it happens that
P (x|θ) and P (y|θ) are proportional func-
tions of θ (that is, constant multiples of
each other), then each of the two data
x and y have exactly the same thing to
say about the value of θ. [Savage (1962a),
page 17, using θ for his λ and P for Pr.]
2. NOTATION AND SKETCH OF
BIRNBAUM’S ARGUMENT
2.1 Points of Notation and Interpretation
Birnbaum focuses on informative inference about
a parameter θ in a given model M , and we retain
that context. The argument calls for a general term
to abbreviate: the inference implication from exper-
iment E and result z, where E is an experiment
involving the observation of Z with a given distri-
bution f(z; θ) and a modelM . We use the following:
InfrE [z]: the parametric statistical infer-
ence from a given or known (E,z).
(We prefer “given” to “known” to avoid refer-
ence to psychology.) We assume relevant features of
model M are embedded in the full statement of ex-
periment E. An inference method indicates how to
compute the informative parametric inference from
(E,z). Let
(E,z)⇒ InfrE [z]: an informative paramet-
ric inference about θ from given (E,z) is
to be computed by means of InfrE [z].
The principles of interest turn on cases where (E,z)
is given, and we reserve “⇒” for such cases. The ab-
breviation InfrE [z], first developed in Cox and Mayo
(2010), could allude to any parametric inference ac-
count; we use it here to allow ready identification
of the particular experiment E and its associated
sampling distribution, whatever it happens to be.
InfrEmix(z) is always understood as using the convex
combination over the elements of the mixture.
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Assertions about how inference “is to be com-
puted given (E,z)” are intended to reflect the prin-
ciples of evidence that arise in Birnbaum’s argu-
ment, whether mathematical or based on intuitive,
philosophical considerations about evidence. This is
important because Birnbaum emphasizes that the
WCP is “not necessary on mathematical grounds
alone, but it seems to be supported compellingly
by considerations . . . concerning the nature of evi-
dential meaning” of data when drawing parametric
statistical inferences [Birnbaum (1962), page 280].
In using “=” we follow the common notation even
though WCP is actually telling us when z1 and z2
should be deemed inferentially equivalent for the as-
sociated inference.
By noncontradiction, for any (E,z), InfrE [z] =
InfrE [z]. So to apply a given inference implication
means its inference directive is used and not some
competing directive at the same time. Two outcomes
z1 and z2 will be said to have the same inference im-
plications in E, and so are inferentially equivalent
within E, whenever InfrE[z1] = InfrE[z2].
2.2 The Strong Likelihood Principle: SLP
The principle under dispute, the SLP, asserts the
inferential equivalence of outcomes from distinct ex-
periments E1 and E2. It is a universal if-then claim:
SLP: For any two experiments E1 and
E2 with different probability models f1(·),
f2(·) but with the same unknown parame-
ter θ, if outcomes x∗ and y∗ (from E1 and
E2, resp.) give rise to proportional likeli-
hood functions (f1(x
∗;θ) = cf2(y
∗;θ) for
all θ, for c a positive constant), then x∗
and y∗ should be inferentially equivalent
for any inference concerning parameter θ.
A shorthand for the entire antecedent is that
(E1,x
∗) is an SLP pair with (E2,y
∗), or just x∗
and y∗ form an SLP pair (from {E1,E2}). Assum-
ing all the SLP stipulations, for example, that θ is
a shared parameter (about which inferences are to
be concerned), we have the following:
SLP: If (E1,x
∗) and (E2,y
∗) form an SLP
pair, then InfrE1 [x
∗] = InfrE2 [y
∗].
Experimental pairs E1 and E2 involve observing
random variables X and Y, respectively. Thus, (E2,
y∗) or just y∗ asserts “E2 is performed and y
∗ ob-
served,” so we may abbreviate InfrE2 [(E2,y
∗)] as
InfrE2 [y
∗]. Likewise for x∗. A generic z is used when
needed.
2.3 Sufficiency Principle (Weak Likelihood
Principle)
For informative inference about θ in E, if TE is a
(minimal) sufficient statistic for E, the Sufficiency
Principle asserts the following:
SP: If TE(z1) = TE(z2), then InfrE [z1] =
InfrE [z2].
That is, since inference within the model is to be
computed using the value of TE(·) and its sampling
distribution, identical values of TE have identical
inference implications, within the stipulated model.
Nothing in our argument will turn on the minimality
requirement, although it is common.
2.3.1 Model checking. An essential part of the
statements of the principles SP, WCP and SLP is
that the validity of the model is granted as ade-
quately representing the experimental conditions at
hand [Birnbaum (1962), page 280]. Thus, accounts
that adhere to the SLP are not thereby prevented
from analyzing features of the data, such as residu-
als, in checking the validity of the statistical model
itself. There is some ambiguity on this point in
Casella and Berger (2002):
Most model checking is, necessarily, based
on statistics other than a sufficient statis-
tic. For example, it is common practice to
examine residuals from a model. . . Such a
practice immediately violates the Suffi-
ciency Principle, since the residuals are
not based on sufficient statistics. (Of
course such a practice directly violates
the [strong] LP also.) [Casella and Berger
(2002), pages 295–296.]
They warn that before considering the SLP and
WCP, “we must be comfortable with the model”
[ibid, page 296]. It seems to us more accurate to re-
gard the principles as inapplicable, rather than vi-
olated, when the adequacy of the relevant model is
lacking. Applying a principle will always be relative
to the associated experimental model.
2.3.2 Can two become one? The SP is sometimes
called the weak likelihood principle, limited as it is
to a single experiment E, with its sampling distri-
bution. This suggests that if an arbitrary SLP pair,
(E1,x
∗) and (E2,y
∗), could be viewed as resulting
from a single experiment (e.g., by a mixture), then
perhaps they could become inferentially equivalent
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using SP. This will be part of Birnbaum’s argument,
but is neatly embedded in his larger gambit to which
we now turn.
2.4 Birnbaumization: Key Gambit in Birnbaum’s
Argument
The larger gambit of Birnbaum’s argument may
be dubbed Birnbaumization. An experiment has
been run, label it as E2, and y
∗ observed. Suppose,
for the parametric inference at hand, that y∗ has an
SLP pair x∗ in a distinct experiment E1. Birnbaum’s
task is to show the two are evidentially equivalent,
as the SLP requires.
We are to imagine that performing E2 was the
result of flipping a fair coin (or some other random-
izer given as irrelevant to θ) to decide whether to
run E1 or E2. Cox terms this the “enlarged exper-
iment” [Cox (1978), page 54], EB . We are then to
define a statistic TB that stipulates that if (E2,y
∗)
is observed, its SLP pair x∗ in the unperformed ex-
periment is reported;
TB(Ei,Zi) =
{
(E1,x
∗), if (E1,x
∗) or (E2,y
∗),
(Ei,zi), otherwise.
Birnbaum’s argument focuses on the first case and
ours will as well.
Following our simplifying notation, whenever E2
is performed and Y = y∗ observed, and y∗ is seen to
admit an SLP pair, then label its particular SLP pair
(E1,x
∗). Any problems of nonuniqueness in identi-
fying SLP pairs are put to one side, and Birnbaum
does not consider them. Thus, when (E2,y
∗) is ob-
served, TB reports it as (E1,x
∗). This yields the
Birnbaum experiment, EB , with its statistic TB . We
abbreviate the inference (about θ) in EB as
InfrEB [y
∗].
The inference implication (about θ) in EB from y
∗
under Birnbaumization is
(E2,y
∗)⇒ InfrEB [x∗],
where the computation in EB is always a convex
combination over E1 and E2. But also,
(E1,x
∗)⇒ InfrEB [x∗].
It follows that, within EB , x
∗ and y∗ are inferen-
tially equivalent. Call this claim
[B] : InfrEB [x
∗] = InfrEB [y
∗].
The argument is to hold for any SLP pair. Now
[B] does not yet reach the SLP which requires
InfrE1 [x
∗] = InfrE2 [y
∗].
But Birnbaum does not stop there. Having con-
structed the hypothetical experiment EB , we are to
use the WCP to condition back down to the known
experiment E2. But this will not produce the SLP
as we now show.
2.5 Why Appeal to Hypothetical Mixtures?
Before turning to that, we address a possible
query: why suppose the argument makes any appeal
to a hypothetical mixture? (See also Section 5.1.)
The reason is this: The SLP does not refer to mix-
tures. It is a universal generalization claiming to
hold for an arbitrary SLP pair. But we have no
objection to imagining [as Birnbaum does (1962),
page 284] a universe of all of the possible SLP pairs,
where each pair has resulted from a θ-irrelevant ran-
domizer (for the given context). Then, when y∗ is
observed, we pluck the relevant pair and construct
TB . Our question is this: why should the inference
implication from y∗ be obtained by reference to
InfrEB [y
∗], the convex combination? Birnbaum does
not stop at [B], but appeals to the WCP. Note the
WCP is based on the outcome y∗ being given.
3. SLP VIOLATION PAIRS
Birnbaum’s argument is of central interest when
we have SLP violations. We may characterize an
SLP violation as any inferential context where the
antecedent of the SLP is true and the consequent is
false:
SLP violation: (E1,x
∗) and (E2,y
∗) form
an SLP pair, but InfrE1 [x
∗] 6= InfrE2 [y∗].
An SLP pair that violates the SLP will be called
an SLP violation pair (from E1, E2, resp.).
It is not always emphasized that whether (and
how) an inference method violates the SLP depends
on the type of inference to be made, even within
an account that allows SLP violations. One cannot
just look at the data, but must also consider the
inference. For example, there may be no SLP viola-
tion if the focus is on point against point hypotheses,
whereas in computing a statistical significance prob-
ability under a null hypothesis there may be. “Signif-
icance testing of a hypothesis. . . is viewed by many
as a crucial element of statistics, yet it provides a
startling and practically serious example of conflict
with the [SLP].” [Berger and Wolpert (1988), pages
104–105.] The following is a dramatic example that
often arises in this context.
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3.1 Fixed versus Sequential Sampling
Suppose X and Y are samples from distinct ex-
periments E1 and E2, both distributed as N(θ,σ
2),
with σ2 identical and known, and p-values are to be
calculated for the null hypothesis H0: θ = 0 against
H1: θ 6= 0.
In E2 the sampling rule is to continue sampling
until yn > cα = 1.96σ/
√
n, where yn =
1
n
∑
n
i=1
yi. In
E1, the sample size n is fixed and α= 0.05.
In order to arrive at the SLP pair, we have to
consider the particular outcome observed. Suppose
that E2 is run and is first able to stop with n= 169
trials. Denote this result as y∗. A choice for its SLP
pair x∗ would be (E1,1.96σ/
√
169), and the SLP
violation is the fact that the p-values associated with
x∗ and y∗ differ.
3.2 Frequentist Evidence in the Case of
Significance Tests
“[S]topping ‘when the data looks good’
can be a serious error when combined
with frequentist measures of evidence. For
instance, if one used the stopping rule
[above]. . . but analyzed the data as if a
fixed sample had been taken, one could
guarantee arbitrarily strong frequentist
‘significance’ against H0 . . . .” [Berger and
Wolpert (1988), page 77.]
From their perspective, the problem is with the
use of frequentist significance. For a detailed discus-
sion in favor of the irrelevance of this stopping rule,
see Berger and Wolpert (1988), pages 74–88. For
sampling theorists, by contrast, this example “taken
in the context of examining consistency with θ = 0,
is enough to refute the strong likelihood principle”
[Cox (1978), page 54], since, with probability 1, it
will stop with a ‘nominally’ significant result even
though θ = 0. It contradicts what Cox and Hinkley
call “the weak repeated sampling principle” [Cox
and Hinkley (1974), page 51]. More generally, the
frequentist principle of evidence (FEV) would re-
gard small p-values as misleading if they result from
a procedure that readily generates small p-values
under H0.
2
2Mayo and Cox (2010), page 254:
FEV: y is (strong) evidence against H0, if and only if, were
H0 a correct description of the mechanism generating y, then,
with high probability this would have resulted in a less dis-
cordant result than is exemplified by y.
For the sampling theorist, to report a 1.96 stan-
dard deviation difference known to have come from
optional stopping, just the same as if the sample size
had been fixed, is to discard relevant information
for inferring inconsistency with the null, while “ac-
cording to any approach that is in accord with the
strong likelihood principle, the fact that this partic-
ular stopping rule has been used is irrelevant.” [Cox
and Hinkley (1974), page 51.]3 The actual p-value
will depend of course on when it stops. We empha-
size that our argument does not turn on accepting
a frequentist principle of evidence (FEV), but these
considerations are useful both to motivate and un-
derstand the core principle of Birnbaum’s argument,
the WCP.
4. THE WEAK CONDITIONALITY PRINCIPLE
(WCP)
From Section 2.4 we have [B] InfrEB [x
∗]= InfrEB [y
∗]
since the inference implication is by the constructed
TB . How might Birnbaum move from [B] to the SLP,
for an arbitrary pair x∗and y∗?
There are two possibilities. One would be to insist
informative inference ignore or be insensitive to sam-
pling distributions. But since we know that SLP vi-
olations result because of the difference in sampling
distributions, to simply deny them would obviously
render his argument circular (or else irrelevant for
sampling theory). We assume Birnbaum does not
intend his argument to be circular and Birnbaum
relies on further steps to which we now turn.
4.1 Mixture (Emix): Two Instruments of
Different Precisions [Cox (1958)]
The crucial principle of inference on which Birn-
baum’s argument rests is the weak conditionality
principle (WCP), intended to indicate the relevant
sampling distribution in the case of certain mix-
ture experiments. The famous example to which we
already alluded, “is now usually called the ‘weigh-
ing machine example,’ which draws attention to the
need for conditioning, at least in certain types of
problems” [Reid (1992), page 582].
We flip a fair coin to decide which of two instru-
ments, E1 or E2, to use in observing a Normally dis-
tributed random sample Z to make inferences about
3Analogous situations occur without optional stopping, as
with selecting a data-dependent, maximally likely, alternative
[Cox and Hinkley (1974), Example 2.4.1, page 51]. See also
Mayo and Kruse (2001).
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mean θ. E1 has variance of 1, while that of E2 is 10
6.
We limit ourselves to mixtures of two experiments.
In testing a null hypothesis such as θ = 0, the same
z measurement would correspond to a much smaller
p-value were it to have come from E1 rather than
from E2: denote them as p1(z) and p2(z), respec-
tively. The overall (or unconditional) significance
level of the mixture Emix is the convex combina-
tion of the p-values: [p1(z) + p2(z)]/2. This would
give a misleading report of how precise or stringent
the actual experimental measurement is [Cox and
Mayo (2010), page 296]. [See Example 4.6, Cox and
Hinkley (1974), pages 95–96; Birnbaum (1962), page
280.]
Suppose that we know we have observed a mea-
surement from E2 with its much larger variance:
The unconditional test says that we can
assign this a higher level of significance
than we ordinarily do, because if we were
to repeat the experiment, we might sam-
ple some quite different distribution. But
this fact seems irrelevant to the interpre-
tation of an observation which we know
came from a distribution [with the larger
variance]. [Cox (1958), page 361.]
The WCP says simply: once it is known which
Ei has produced z, the p-value or other inferential
assessment should be made with reference to the ex-
periment actually run.
4.2 Weak Conditionality Principle (WCP) in the
Weighing Machine Example
We first state the WCP in relation to this exam-
ple.
We are given (Emix,zi), that is, (Ei,zi) results
from mixture experiment Emix. WCP exhorts us to
condition to be relevant to the experiment actually
producing the outcome. This is an example of what
Cox terms “conditioning for relevance.”
WCP: Given (Emix,zi), condition on the
Ei producing the result
(Emix,zi)⇒ InfrEi [(Emix,zi)]
= pi(z) = InfrEi [zi].
Do not use the unconditional formulation
(Emix,zi); InfrEmix[(Emix,zi)]
= [p1(z) + p2(z)]/2.
The concern is that
InfrEmix [(Emix,zi)] = [p1(z) + p2(z)]/2 6= pi(z).
There are three sampling distributions, and the
WCP says the relevant one to use whenever
InfrEmix [zi] 6= InfrEi [zi] is the one known to have gen-
erated the result [Birnbaum (1962), page 280]. In
other cases the WCP would make no difference.
4.3 The WCP and Its Corollaries
We can give a general statement of the WCP as
follows:
A mixture Emix selects between E1 and E2, using
a θ-irrelevant process, and it is given that (Ei,zi)
results, i= 1,2. WCP directs the inference implica-
tion. Knowing we are mapping an outcome from a
mixture, there is no need to repeat the first com-
ponent of (Emix,zi), so it is dropped except when a
reminder seems useful:
(i) Condition to obtain relevance:
(Emix,zi)⇒ InfrEi [(Emix,zi)] = InfrEi(zi).
In words, zi arose from Emix but the inference
implication is based on Ei.
(ii) Eschew unconditional formulations:
(Emix,zi); InfrEmix [zi],
whenever the unconditional treatment yields a
different inference implication,
that is, whenever InfrEmix[zi] 6= InfrEi [zi].
Note. InfrEmix [zi] which abbreviates
InfrEmix [(Emix,zi)] asserts that the inference impli-
cation uses the convex combination of the relevant
pair of experiments.
We now highlight some points for reference.
4.3.1 WCP makes a difference. The cases of in-
terest here are where applying WCP would alter
the unconditional implication. In these cases WCP
makes a difference.
Note that (ii) blocks computing the inference im-
plication from (Emix,zi) as InfrEmix[zi], whenever
InfrEmix [zi] 6= InfrEi [zi] for i= 1,2. Here E1, E2 and
Emix would correspond to three sampling distribu-
tions.
WCP requires the experiment and its outcome to
be given or known: If it is given only that z came
from E1 or E2, and not which, then WCP does not
authorize (i). In fact, we would wish to block such
an inference implication. For instance,
(E1 or E2,z); InfrE1 [z].
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Point on notation: The use of “⇒” is for a given
outcome. We may allow it to be used without am-
biguity when only a disjunction is given, because
while E1 entails (E1 or E2), the converse does not
hold. So no erroneous substitution into an inference
implication would follow.
4.3.2 Irrelevant augmentation: Keep irrelevant
facts irrelevant (Irrel). Another way to view the
WCP is to see it as exhorting us to keep what is ir-
relevant to the sampling behavior of the experiment
performed irrelevant (to the inference implication).
Consider Birnbaum’s (1969), page 119, idea that a
“trivial” but harmless addition to any given exper-
imental result z might be to toss a fair coin and
augment z with a report of heads or tails (where
this is irrelevant to the original model). Note the
similarity to attempts to get an exact significance
level in discrete tests, by allowing borderline out-
comes to be declared significant or not (at the given
level) according to the outcome of a coin toss. The
WCP, of course, eschews this. But there is a crucial
ambiguity to avoid. It is a harmless addition only
if it remains harmless to the inference implication.
If it is allowed to alter the test result, it is scarcely
harmless.
A holder of the WCP may stipulate that a given
zi can always be augmented with the result of a θ-
irrelevant randomizer, provided that it remains ir-
relevant to the inference implication about θ in Ei.
We can abbreviate this irrelevant augmentation of a
given result zi as a conjunction: (Ei & Irrel),
(Irrel): InfrEi [(Ei & Irrel,zi)] = InfrEi [zi],
i= 1,2.
We illuminate this in the next subsection.
4.3.3 Is the WCP an equivalence? “It was the
adoption of an unqualified equivalence formulation
of conditionality, and related concepts, which led,
in my 1962 paper, to the monster of the likelihood
axiom” [Birnbaum (1975), page 263]. He admits the
contrast with “the one-sided form to which applica-
tions” had been restricted [Birnbaum (1969), page
139, note 11]. The question of whether the WCP is
a proper equivalence relation, holding in both direc-
tions, is one of the most central issues in the argu-
ment. But what would be alleged to be equivalent?
Obviously not the unconditional and the condi-
tional inference implications: the WCP makes a dif-
ference just when they are inequivalent, that is,
when InfrEmix[zi] 6= InfrEi [zi]. Our answer is that the
WCP involves an inequivalence as well as an equiv-
alence. The WCP prescribes conditioning on the ex-
periment known to have produced the data, and
not the other way around. It is their inequivalence
that gives Cox’s WCP its normative proscriptive
force. To assume the WCP identifies InfrEmix[zi] and
InfrEi [zi] leads to trouble. (We return to this in Sec-
tion 7.)
However, there is an equivalence in WCP (i). Fur-
ther, once the outcome is given, the addition of θ-
irrelevant features about the selection of the exper-
iment performed are to remain irrelevant to the in-
ference implication:
InfrEi [(Emix,zi)] = InfrEi [(Ei & Irrel,zi)].
Both are the same as InfrEi [zi]. While claiming that
z came from a mixture, even knowing it came from
a nonmixture, may seem unsettling, we grant it for
purposes of making out Birnbaum’s argument. By
(Irrel), it cannot alter the inference implication un-
der Ei.
5. BIRNBAUM’S SLP ARGUMENT
5.1 Birnbaumization and the WCP
What does the WCP entail as regards Birnbau-
mization? Now WCP refers to mixtures, but is the
Birnbaum experiment EB a mixture experiment?
Not really. One cannot perform the following: Toss
a fair coin (or other θ-irrelevant randomizer). If it
lands heads, perform an experiment E2 that yields
a member of an SLP pair y∗; if tails, observe an ex-
periment that yields the other member of the SLP
pair x∗. We do not know what outcome would have
resulted from the unperformed experiment, much
less that it would be an outcome with a propor-
tional likelihood to the observed y∗. There is a sin-
gle experiment, and it is stipulated we know which
and what its outcome was. Some have described
the Birnbaum experiment as unperformable, or at
most a “mathematical mixture” rather than an “ex-
perimental mixture” [Kalbfleisch (1975), pages 252–
253]. Birnbaum himself calls it a “hypothetical”
mixture [Birnbaum (1962), page 284].
While a holder of the WCP may simply deny its
general applicability in hypothetical experiments,
given that Birnbaum’s argument has stood for over
fifty years, we wish to give it maximal mileage. Birn-
baumization may be “performed” in the sense that
TB can be defined for any SLP pair x
∗, y∗. Refer
back to the hypothetical universe of SLP pairs, each
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imagined to have been generated from a θ-irrelevant
mixture (Section 2.5). When we observe y∗ we pluck
the x∗ companion needed for the argument. In short,
we can Birnbaumize an experimental result: Con-
structing statistic TB with the derived experiment
EB is the “performance.” But what cannot shift in
the argument is the stipulation that Ei be given or
known (as noted in Section 4.3.1), that i be fixed.
Nor can the meaning of “given z∗” shift through the
argument, if it is to be sound.
Given z∗, the WCP precludes Birnbaumizing. On
the other hand, if the reported z∗ was the value
of TB , then we are given only the disjunction, pre-
cluding the computation relevant for i fixed (Sec-
tion 4.3.1). Let us consider the components of Birn-
baum’s argument.
5.2 Birnbaum’s Argument
(E2,y
∗) is given (and it has an SLP pair x∗). The
question is to its inferential import. Birnbaum will
seek to show that
InfrE2 [y
∗] = InfrE1 [x
∗].
The value of TB is (E1,x
∗). Birnbaumization maps
outcomes into hypothetical mixtures EB :
(1) If the inference implication is by the stipulations
of EB ,
(E2,y
∗)⇒ InfrEB [x∗] = InfrEB [y∗].
Likewise for (E1,x
∗). TB is a sufficient statistic
for EB (the conditional distribution of Z given
TB is independent of θ).
(2) If the inference implication is by WCP,
(E2,y
∗); InfrEB [y
∗],
rather
(E2,y
∗)⇒ InfrE2 [y∗]
and
(E1,x
∗)⇒ InfrE1 [x∗].
Following the inference implication according to
EB in (1) is at odds with what the WCP stipu-
lates in (2). Given y∗, Birnbaumization directs us-
ing the convex combination over the components of
TB ; WCP eschews doing so. We will not get
InfrE1 [x
∗] = InfrE2 [y
∗].
The SLP only seems to follow by the erroneous
identity:
InfrEB [z
∗
i ] = InfrEi [z
∗
i ] for i= 1,2.
5.3 Refuting the Supposition that [(SP and
WCP) entails SLP]
We can uphold both (1) and (2), while at the same
time holding the following:
(3) InfrE1 [x
∗] 6= InfrE2 [y∗].
Specifically, any case where x∗ and y∗ is an SLP
violation pair is a case where (3) is true. Since when-
ever (3) holds we have a counterexample to the
SLP generalization, this demonstrates that SP and
WCP and not-SLP are logically consistent. Thus,
so are WCP and not-SLP. This refutes the supposi-
tion that [(SP and WCP) entails SLP] and also any
purported derivation of SLP from WCP alone.4
SP is not blocked in (1). The SP is always relative
to a model, here EB . We have the following:
x∗ and y∗ are SLP pairs in EB , and
InfrEB [x
∗] = InfrEB [y
∗] (i.e., [B] holds).
One may allow different contexts to dictate whether
or not to condition [i.e., whether to apply (1) or (2)],
but we know of no inference account that permits,
let alone requires, self-contradictions. By noncontra-
diction, for any (E,z), InfrE[z] = InfrE [z]. (“⇒” is
a function from outcomes to inference implications,
and z= z, for any z.)
Upholding and applying. This recalls our points
in Section 2.1. Applying a rule means following its
inference directive. We may uphold the if-then stip-
ulations in (1) and (2), but to apply their competing
implications in a single case is self-contradictory.
Arguing from a self-contradiction is unsound.
The slogan that anything follows from a self-
contradiction G and not-G is true, since for any
claim C, the following is a logical truth: If G then
(if not-G then C). Two applications of modus po-
nens yield C. One can also derive not-C! But since
G and its denial cannot be simultaneously true,
any such argument is unsound. (A sound argument
must have true premises and be logically valid.) We
know Birnbaum was not intending to argue from
a self-contradiction, but this may inadvertently oc-
cur.
4By allowing applications of Birnbaumization and appro-
priate choices of the irrelevant randomization probabilities,
SP can be weakened to “mathematical equivalence,” or even
(with compounded mixtures) omitted so that WCP would en-
tail SLP. See Birnbaum (1972) and Evans, Fraser and Monette
(1986).
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5.4 What if the SLP Pair Arose from an Actual
Mixture?
What if the SLP pair x∗, y∗ arose from a genuine,
and not a Birnbaumized, mixture. (Consider fixed
versus sequential sampling, Section 3.1. Suppose E1
fixes n at 169, the coin flip says perform E2, and it
happens to stop at n= 169.) We may allow that an
unconditional formulation may be defined so that
InfrEmix[x
∗] = InfrEmix [y
∗].
But WCP eschews the unconditional formulation;
it says condition on the experiment known to have
produced zi:
(Emix,z
∗
i )⇒ InfrEi [z∗i ], i= 1,2.
Any SLP violation pair x∗,y∗ remains one:
InfrE1 [x
∗] 6= InfrE2 [y∗].
6. DISCUSSION
We think a fresh look at this venerable argument
is warranted. Wearing a logician’s spectacles and en-
tering the debate outside of the thorny issues from
decades ago may be an advantage.
It must be remembered that the onus is not on
someone who questions if the SLP follows from SP
and WCP to provide suitable principles of evidence,
however desirable it might be to have them. The
onus is on Birnbaum to show that for any given y∗,
a member of an SLP pair with x∗, with different
probability models f1(·), f2(·), that he will be able
to derive from SP and WCP, that x∗ and y∗ would
have the identical inference implications concerning
shared parameter θ. We have shown that SLP viola-
tions do not entail renouncing either the SP or the
WCP.
It is no rescue of Birnbaum’s argument that a sam-
pling theorist wants principles in addition to the
WCP to direct the relevant sampling distribution
for inference; indeed, Cox has given others. It was
to make the application of the WCP in his argu-
ment as plausible as possible to sampling theorists
that Birnbaum begins with the type of mixture in
Cox’s (1958) famous example of instruments E1, E2
with different precisions.
We do not assume sampling theory, but employ a
formulation that avoids ruling it out in advance. The
failure of Birnbaum’s argument to reach the SLP re-
lies only on a correct understanding of the WCP. We
may grant that for any y∗ its SLP pair could occur
in repetitions (and may even be out there as in Sec-
tion 2.5). However, the key point of the WCP is to
deny that this fact should alter the inference im-
plication from the known y∗. To insist it should is
to deny the WCP. Granted, WCP sought to identify
the relevant sampling distribution for inference from
a specified type of mixture, and a known y∗, but
it is Birnbaum who purports to give an argument
that is relevant for a sampling theorist and for “ap-
proaches which are independent of this [Bayes’] prin-
ciple” [Birnbaum (1962), page 283]. Its implications
for sampling theory is why it was dubbed “a land-
mark in statistics” [Savage (1962b), page 307].
Let us look at the two statements about inference
implications from a given (E2,y
∗), applying (1) and
(2) in Section 5.2:
(E2,y
∗)⇒ InfrEB [x∗],
(E2,y
∗)⇒ InfrE2 [y∗].
Can both be applied in exactly the same model with
the same given z? The answer is yes, so long as the
WCP happens to make no difference:
InfrEB [z
∗
i ] = InfrEi [z
∗
i ], i= 1,2.
Now the SLP must be applicable to an arbitrary
SLP pair. However, to assume that (1) and (2) can
be consistently applied for any x∗,y∗ pair would be
to assume no SLP violations are possible, which re-
ally would render Birnbaum’s argument circular. So
from Section 5.3, the choices are to regard Birn-
baum’s argument as unsound (arguing from a con-
tradiction) or circular (assuming what it purports
to prove). Neither is satisfactory. We are left with
competing inference implications and no way to get
to the SLP. There is evidence Birnbaum saw the gap
in his argument (Birnbaum (1972)), and in the end
he held the SLP only restricted to (predesignated)
point against point hypotheses.5
It is not SP and WCP that conflict; the conflict
comes from WCP together with Birnbaumization—
understood as both invoking the hypothetical mix-
ture and erasing the information as to which ex-
periment the data came. If one Birnbaumizes, one
cannot at the same time uphold the “keep irrele-
vants irrelevant” (Irrel) stipulation of the WCP. So
for any given (E,z) one must choose, and the an-
swer is straightforward for a holder of the WCP. To
5This alone would not oust all sampling distributions. Birn-
baum’s argument, even were it able to get a foothold, would
have to apply further rounds of conditioning to arrive at the
data alone.
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paraphrase Cox’s (1958), page 361, objection to un-
conditional tests:
Birnbaumization says that we can assign
y∗ a different level of significance than we
ordinarily do, because one may identify an
SLP pair x∗ and construct statistic TB .
But this fact seems irrelevant to the in-
terpretation of an observation which we
know came from E2. To conceal the index,
and use the convex combination, would
give a distorted assessment of statistical
significance.
7. RELATION TO OTHER CRITICISMS OF
BIRNBAUM
A number of critical discussions of the Birnbaum
argument and the SLP exist. While space makes
it impossible to discuss them here, we believe the
current analysis cuts through this extremely com-
plex literature. Take, for example, the most well-
known criticisms by Durbin (1970) and Kalbfleish
(1975), discussed in the excellent paper by Evans,
Fraser and Monette (1986). Allowing that any y∗
may be viewed as having arisen from Birnbaum’s
mathematical mixture, they consider the proper or-
der of application of the principles. If we condition
on the given experiment first, Kalbfleish’s revised
sufficiency principle is inapplicable, so Birnbaum’s
argument fails. On the other hand, Durbin argues,
if we reduce to the minimal sufficient statistic first,
then his revised principle of conditionality cannot be
applied. Again Birnbaum’s argument fails. So either
way it fails.
Unfortunately, the idea that one must revise the
initial principles in order to block SLP allows down-
playing or dismissing these objections as tanta-
mount to denying SLP at any cost (please see the
references6). We can achieve what they wish to
show, without altering principles, and from WCP
alone. Given y∗, WCP blocks Birnbaumization;
given y∗ has been Birnbaumized, the WCP pre-
cludes conditioning.
We agree with Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986),
page 193, “that Birnbaum’s use of [the principles]
6In addition to the authors cited in the manuscript, see es-
pecially comments by Savage, Cornfield, Bross, Pratt, Demp-
ster et al. (1962) on Birnbaum. For later discussions, see
Barndorff-Nielsen (1975), Berger (1986), Berger and Wolpert
(1988), Birnbaum (1970a, 1970b), Dawid (1986), Savage
(1970) and references therein.
. . . are contrary to the intentions of the principles,
as judged by the relevant supporting and motivat-
ing examples. From this viewpoint we can state that
the intentions of S and C do not imply L.” [Where
S, C and L are our SP, WCP and SLP.] Like Durbin
and Kalbfleisch, they offer a choice of modifications
of the principles to block the SLP. These are highly
insightful and interesting; we agree that they high-
light a need to be clear on the experimental model
at hand. Still, it is preferable to state the WCP so
as to reflect these “intentions,” without which it is
robbed of its function. The problem stems from mis-
taking WCP as the equivalence InfrEmix[z] = InfrEi [z]
(whether the mixture is hypothetical or actual).
This is at odds with the WCP. The puzzle is solved
by adequately stating the WCP. Aside from that,
we need only keep the meaning of terms consistent
through the argument.
We emphasize that we are neither rejecting the SP
nor claiming that it breaks down, even in the spe-
cial case EB . The sufficiency of TB within EB , as a
mathematical concept, holds: the value of TB “suf-
fices” for InfrEB [y
∗], the inference from the associ-
ated convex combination. Whether reference to hy-
pothetical mixture EB is relevant for inference from
given y∗ is a distinct question. For an alternative
criticism see Evans (2013).
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An essential component of informative inference
for sampling theorists is the relevant sampling dis-
tribution: it is not a separate assessment of perfor-
mance, but part of the necessary ingredients of in-
formative inference. It is this feature that enables
sampling theory to have SLP violations (e.g., in sig-
nificance testing contexts). Any such SLP violation,
according to Birnbaum’s argument, prevents adher-
ing to both SP and WCP. We have shown that SLP
violations do not preclude WCP and SP.
The SLP does not refer to mixtures. But sup-
posing that (E2,y
∗) is given, Birnbaum asks us to
consider that y∗ could also have resulted from a θ-
irrelevant mixture that selects between E1, E2. The
WCP says this piece of information should be irrele-
vant for computing the inference from (E2,y
∗) once
given. That is, InfrEi [(Emix,y
∗)] = InfrEi [y
∗], i =
1,2. It follows that if InfrE1 [x
∗] 6= InfrE2 [y∗], the two
remain unequal after the recognition that y∗ could
have come from the mixture. What was an SLP vi-
olation remains one.
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Given y∗, the WCP says do not Birnbaumize. One
is free to do so, but not to simultaneously claim
to hold the WCP in relation to the given y∗, on
pain of logical contradiction. If one does choose to
Birnbaumize, and to construct TB , admittedly the
known outcome y∗ yields the same value of TB as
would x∗. Using the sample space of EB yields [B]:
InfrEB [x
∗] = InfrEB [y
∗]. This is based on the con-
vex combination of the two experiments and differs
from both InfrE1 [x
∗] and InfrE2 [y
∗]. So again, any
SLP violation remains. Granted, if only the value
of TB is given, using InfrEB may be appropriate.
For then we are given only the disjunction: either
(E1,x
∗) or (E2,y
∗). In that case, one is barred from
using the implication from either individual Ei. A
holder of WCP might put it this way: once (E,z) is
given, whether E arose from a θ-irrelevant mixture
or was fixed all along should not matter to the in-
ference, but whether a result was Birnbaumized or
not should, and does, matter.
There is no logical contradiction in holding that if
data are analyzed one way (using the convex com-
bination in EB), a given answer results, and if ana-
lyzed another way (via WCP), one gets quite a dif-
ferent result. One may consistently apply both the
EB and the WCP directives to the same result, in
the same experimental model, only in cases where
WCP makes no difference. To claim for any x∗, y∗,
the WCP never makes a difference, however, would
assume that there can be no SLP violations, which
would make the argument circular.7 Another pos-
sibility would be to hold, as Birnbaum ultimately
did, that the SLP is “clearly plausible” [Birnbaum
(1968), page 301] only in “the severely restricted
case of a parameter space of just two points” where
these are predesignated [Birnbaum (1969), page
128]. But that is to relinquish the general result.
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